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Abstract 
The global economic crisis refocused attention on the governance of international economic 
institutions (IEIs). This study uses the analytical framework of club theory to highlight 
structural obstacles to reform in international macroeconomic management, development 
finance, trade, and financial stability. The authors argue that reforms currently being 
discussed—for example, in voting power in the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank—are important, but not sufficient to make IEIs adaptable to the demands of a rapidly 
changing world economy. The authors propose transforming IEIs by shifting more decisions 
from the global to sub-global level. Partially decentralized decision making already exists in 
some policy areas (for example in regional development banks) and could expand and 
improve the provision of international public goods. 
 
JEL Classification: F02, F13, F33, F42 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The global economic crisis has refocused attention on the governance of international 
economic institutions (IEIs), especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although IEIs 
were invisible in the early stages of the crisis, there is growing agreement that they should 
be more central in managing and averting crises in the future. The IMF received special 
attention at the 2009 London Summit, but remains the “third rail” in the politics of many 
developing countries due to its role in the 1997–1998 Asian crisis. Given the need to restore 
the IMF’s credibility, much recent work
1 has focused on what Edwin Truman has called the 
“chairs and shares” issues—concrete changes in the IMF’s management, staffing, and 
voting structure. Less acute but also difficult challenges face other IEIs such as the World 
Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). 
This study examines IEI reforms from an analytical perspective—based on the theory of 
clubs—that highlights structural challenges in international economic governance. It 
identifies a “governance trilemma” that makes it difficult for IEIs to be universal, democratic, 
and effective at the same time. Reforms in chairs and shares are important, but do not 
resolve the trilemma and are not likely to make IEIs adaptable to the demands of a rapidly 
changing world economy. More systemic innovations will be needed. 
One promising strategy is to transform current IEIs into institutions (or families of institutions) 
with a partially decentralized decision-making structure. This could be achieved by allowing 
smaller groups of countries to make decisions within current institutions (an approach called 
“variable geometry” in some contexts) or by developing closely linked institutions with 
different memberships. In either case, some authority would shift from the global to sub-
global level. This shift would make international decisions more flexible and accountable, 
making them more like decisions within countries, which typically involve several layers of 
government. Specific applications to international institutions will be suggested below. 
Such decentralized decision making is not hypothetical; it already exists in some 
international policy areas and its relative importance appears to be rising. The World Bank is 
complemented by four major regional development banks and several other multilateral 
banks. World trade agreements are paralleled by many regional ones. And there are sub-
global institutions (or ad hoc arrangements) engaged in macroeconomic surveillance and 
liquidity support. Recent reforms at the IMF suggest further intriguing changes in how—and 
by whom—loans are negotiated. All these trends, viewed in the present analytical context, 
point to more flexible and effective directions of governance. 
To be sure, decentralized decisions create new challenges: sub-global decisions need to be 
made globally coherent in order to act as “building blocks” of a global system. This argues 
for paying close attention to connections within a decentralized structure. But if successfully 
linked, a partially decentralized system would help the world’s IEIs respond to a wider range 
of problems more quickly and more effectively. On a global level, IEIs could also focus more 
sharply on truly global issues. 
The value of decentralization rests on its ability to yield public goods that are important to 
some, but not all, countries. Geographical proximity is one, but not the only, reason for 
similar preferences for public goods. For example, countries engaged in deep-sea fishing 
share common concerns related to the oceans and will want to cooperate on arrangements 
affecting fisheries. Decentralization enhances the productivity of the world’s “public goods 
industry” and relieves the pressure on global institutions to meet sub-global needs. But 
narrower public goods should not come at the expense of global ones; the institutional 
framework should have coherent global and sub-global mechanisms as its ultimate goal. 
                                                  
1 For example Truman (2008), IMF (2008a, 2008b), Bryant (2008a, 2008b), Cooper and Truman (2007), Dervis 
and Ozer (2005). A wider range of studies, some addressing structural issues as well as reform options, are 
collected in Truman (2006). 
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This requires changes in the functions of the existing global and sub-global institutions and, 
if needed, the creation of new sub-global institutions. 
To keep this analysis manageable, the paper focuses on the “big three” institutions (the IMF, 
World Bank, and WTO) that address macroeconomic stability, development finance, and 
trade liberalization, respectively. All three institutions were proposed at the Bretton Woods 
conference in 1944, although the WTO formally came into existence only fifty years later.
2 
We will review criticisms of these organizations and the potential for applying a decentralized 
decision-making framework to their activities. We will also provide preliminary thoughts on 
how sub-global bodies may function under the FSB. 
In addition to functional institutions, various country groupings (“G forums”) have also 
become important international actors in recent years. The Group of Seven (G7) (large 
industrial economies) and the Group of Eight (G8) (with Russia) have been the most active 
historically, but the Group of Twenty (G20) (G8 plus major emerging economies) has gained 
prominence as a response group to the global financial and economic crisis.
3 These forums 
play important leadership and coordinating roles, but are not (so far) IEIs with a concrete 
institutional mission and charter. 
2.  IMPLICATIONS OF CLUB THEORY 
IEIs are clubs in the sense that they produce goods that are at least partially non-rivalrous 
(more than one user can consume them) and at least partially excludable (users can be 
denied access to them). Their most important services include order and predictability in 
international commerce and finance. Although these services are generally enjoyed by 
countries without diminishing their value to others, IEIs also offer services specifically to 
members that generate demand for membership. 
Club theory
4 has been widely used in economics and political science, including in the 
analysis of international organizations (Ruggie 1972; Fratianni and Pattison 1982, 2001; 
Kahler and Lake 2003; Keohane and Nye 2003; Lawrence 2008). We focus on three major 
insights. First, the provision of club goods fills an important gap: clubs can lead to Pareto-
optimal results by supplying public goods under optimizing conditions that are similar to 
those in market production. Second, the expansion of club membership tends to make clubs 
less effective: decisions are harder to align as the preferences of members diverge. Third, 
clubs tend to be relatively inflexible institutions: club charters are usually designed to 
maintain firm control in the hands of founding members and those who share their 
preferences. 
2.1  Provision 
Because clubs overcome free-rider problems by sharing costs, they produce services (and 
hence consumer surplus) that cannot be generated in markets. If a club maximizes the 
benefits of its members, it can be shown to bring the marginal rate of substitution between 
the services it provides and normal goods into equality with the marginal rate of 
transformation among them. Thus, the welfare implications of club decisions are similar to 
those of market decisions under competition: the relative prices of club goods, as other 
                                                  
2 The proposed International Trade Organization was not agreed upon, and the General Agreements on Tariffs 
and Trade was established instead to manage trade relations. It was replaced with the WTO in 1994. 
3 The Group of Twenty-four (G24) (prominent emerging market economies) and the Group of Seventy-seven 
(G77) (a more inclusive group of emerging economies) provide additional forums for developing country views. 
Brazil, Russia, India, and People’s Republic of China (PRC) (the BRICs) have also attracted attention as a 
forum for the four most powerful emerging economies. 
4 See Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) for a comprehensive survey. Seminal contributions were made by Buchanan 
(1965). 
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goods, equal their relative marginal costs of production. Since they operate in the global 
arena, IEIs offer services that are especially unlikely to be produced by markets and their 
contribution to welfare is potentially very large. But the extent to which they “fill the space” of 
required public goods may be limited. As discussed below, IEIs, unlike smaller government 
organizations such as municipalities, are less likely to face competitive pressures that lead to 
efficient production decisions. 
2.2  Membership 
Clubs set criteria for admission and may limit membership. Analytically, they can be 
expected to equate the net benefit of adding a member to the costs imposed on existing 
members. Since many international public goods are non-rivalrous, IEIs have little reason to 
limit membership from the production viewpoint, but adding members does increase costs in 
decision making. Political pressures for inclusion have nevertheless led to steady and 
substantial growth in the membership of the “big three.”
5 
Expansion tends to increase the heterogeneity of membership. This usually implies demand 
for a wider range of services and also, as Fratianni and Pattison (2001) point out, increases 
decision-making costs. Since a member’s welfare depends on the extent to which the club 
addresses its preferences, its welfare may be lowered if the club becomes more diverse and 
begins to produce (from the member’s viewpoint) the wrong services. These effects may be 
especially costly to existing members if the club has an inclusive decision-making structure. 
For example, if decisions are made by consensus, then each new member gets an effective 
veto. Expansion has created problems in all three major IEIs, and especially in the WTO, 
which is governed by consensus rather than by qualified voting. 
2.3  Club Dynamics 
Clubs are usually analyzed in a static context, under the implicit assumption that provision 
and membership are decided once and for all. But international institutions exist for long 
periods of time, and during this time their membership and external environment are likely to 
change. The extent to which clubs adapt to changing environments thus becomes 
increasingly important to their operations over time. 
When a new club is created, members have common interests and design services to meet 
their common needs. (In the simplest club models, decision making is not even considered, 
since any member is assumed to be representative and thus able to make decisions for a 
club.) This may be a reasonable approximation of the environment of the Bretton Woods era, 
when the United States (US), United Kingdom, and France made essentially all major 
decisions and awarded themselves a majority of the voting shares of global institutions, but 
is clearly not applicable today. 
The founders of clubs recognize that over time their interests could diverge as other 
members are added and/or their relative power or external environment changes. To make 
sure that their investments and contributions are nevertheless protected, founders usually 
adopt rules that limit changes in club policies and vest control in themselves and others who 
are likely to share their interests. Club charters do this by limiting changes in: 
•  membership, by setting admission criteria to ensure the alignment of the interests 
of new members with those of old ones; 
                                                  
5 These pressures apply to all international clubs; for example, the European Union (EU) expanded widely into 
Eastern Europe, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has included Latin American countries 
and Russia, and even the G20, just between its November 2008 and April 2009 meetings, expanding from 20 
to 29 participants. 
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•  the range of services provided, by requiring supermajority votes on policy changes; 
and 
•  the charter itself, by requiring supermajority votes for rule changes. 
Charters thus make it difficult for clubs to change the types of services they offer, to admit 
“different” members, or to reform governance. 
As a result of such rules, clubs are less adaptable than firms. A firm is responsible to 
shareholders in financial terms and is charged with adjusting its products and services to 
new commercial opportunities. By contrast, as long as a club remains in business, it will 
continue to produce only those services that benefit its controlling members, even if its 
assets could be more productively deployed to other services that address non-controlling 
members or non-member communities. Even if clubs initially satisfy optimality conditions 
similar to those of firms in markets, they will not do so as they age and, over time, the club’s 
production structure will diverge from that of a profit-maximizing firm.
6 Because clubs tend to 
be long-lived,
7 they face increasing efficiency losses as their members’ preferences diverge 
and environments change. Meanwhile, their governance becomes more contentious and 
less decisive. 
2.4  Competition and Adaptation 
Despite these rigidities, clubs may produce an optimum array of public goods if certain 
conditions hold. An interesting analysis of clubs takes particular advantage of their rigidities 
to argue that efficiencies can emerge from competition among clubs. Tiebout (1956) 
assumes that different political communities offer stable portfolios of services and use those 
to compete for members. (The stability of services presumably reflects constraints in 
municipal charters.) System-wide efficiency is achieved if the number of municipalities 
exceeds the variety of preferences to be accommodated and each required services can be 
produced on a reasonable scale. People then sort themselves into homogeneous 
communities, each of which optimizes the provision of public goods consistent with their 
preferences. Unfortunately, some public goods have to be produced on a scale that does not 
permit such competition. This is especially so for international public goods, such as a 
system of global rules to govern trade. 
Clubs not only resist change, but also “take up space” and impede the development of new 
clubs in their areas of operation. If a new club can become viable only by recruiting the 
members of an existing club, then existing clubs may prevent the new club from forming, 
even if the latter would generate greater benefits.
8 Clubs do this by making it just worthwhile 
for their marginal member to stay, thus depriving new clubs of the contributions of members 
of existing clubs. 
Thus, competition does not help to overcome the rigidity of international clubs, as it might in 
the case of smaller governing units. Conventional reforms—say, adjustments in voting 
shares—will not help either, since, at best, they align decisions better with a club’s 
(changing) median member. We argue that reforms are also needed to facilitate flexible 
decision making within clubs (or in allied institutions) in order to make them adaptable and 
effective. 
                                                  
6 If clubs were easy to close, these objectives would merge, as the founders could dissolve an inefficient club, 
liquidate its assets, and distribute its assets back to the owners. However, clubs seldom dissolve this way. 
7  An example of such exceptional longevity is provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), which was established to oversee the Marshall Plan in 1948. Although this mission 
ended in 1951, the OECD found new missions and even a new name. In recent years it has become an 
especially useful platform for groups of countries that seek to find common ground and best practices in 
structural issues such as subsidies, investment, and competition policy. 
8 It has been argued, for example, that the APEC grouping was formed preemptively to prevent the development 
of a narrower East Asian economic grouping proposed by some Asian countries at the time. 
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3.  INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AS CLUBS 
The IMF, World Bank, and WTO generally conform to the predictions of club theory. Their 
memberships have expanded several-fold since they were founded, and all have become 
more heterogeneous through the diverging interests of original members and the addition of 
new ones. Yet their governance structures and voting shares are relatively unchanged. 
Given the inflexibility of these institutions, alternative organizations have begun to develop 
around them. Regional development banks have been created in Latin America, Asia, Africa, 
and Europe. The various “G forums” cover some of the turf of IEIs as well as provide 
oversight for them. Regional forums, like the European Union (EU), Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), and East Asia Summit, focus on common issues among closely 
interdependent countries. And some functions, including financial supervision, are being 
addressed with new institutions, such as the new FSB. These alternative organizations are 
attractive because they are (for now) smaller and more homogeneous. 
3.1  Macroeconomic Stability 
The IMF, originally charged with maintaining stability in a fixed exchange rate system, has 
become a more general agency for maintaining global macroeconomic stability. With rising 
international capital mobility, its work has shifted to short-term lending to countries with 
liquidity problems, usually as a result of balance-of-payments crises caused by capital 
outflows. The widespread failure of financial systems in advanced economies in the current 
global crisis is likely to transform, or at least expand, the IMF’s mandate once again. 
The IMF addresses its mission through surveillance, lending, and technical support.
9  
Surveillance involves monitoring economic and financial developments, and offering policy 
advice in order to prevent or manage crises. The results of global surveillance are published 
in the World Economic Outlook and Global Financial Stability Report. Bilateral surveillance 
involves annual consultations with member authorities based on Article IV.
10 Its results are 
reported in Public Information Notices.
11 Recently, the IMF has begun to publish regional 
economic outlooks focusing on major regions of the world as part of its regional surveillance 
efforts. The IMF also provides technical assistance to help countries analyze issues and 
build capacity in macroeconomic and financial policy. 
Until recently, IMF lending was accompanied by rigorous policy conditions on borrowing 
countries. These loans, made under stand-by agreements (SBAs) lasting for one to two 
years, were dispersed as borrowers met criteria for monetary, fiscal, and structural targets. 
The SBAs were backed up in 1997 with a supplemental reserve facility and other facilities 
designed to provide larger loans with shorter maturities to countries facing a capital account 
crisis and/or unusual shocks.
12 In the 2008 crisis, the IMF pushed the envelope a step 
further, introducing a new short-term liquidity facility (SLF) to offer quick, large-scale 
financing without explicit conditionality. But even the SLF proved ineffective, and in March 
2009 it was superseded by a flexible credit line (FCL) facility, which assured pre-qualified 
                                                  
9 See http://www.imf.org/external/work.htm for details. 
10 For more information on the IMF’s bilateral surveillance activities, see Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over 
Members' Policies (http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2007/pn0769.htm#decision). 
11 In this relatively new effort to increase transparency, the IMF needs the consent of the member country to 
publish the notice. Most countries have been giving their consent. 
12 Other IMF facilities address balance-of-payments problems due to special causes such as structural problems, 
natural disasters, military conflicts, trade liberalization, and exogenous shocks. Poverty reduction is not an 
explicit IMF objective, but the IMF can offer concessional interest rates to low-income countries through its 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. 
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countries large, flexible, upfront access to resources without ex-post conditions.
13 The SLF 
and FCL are major departures for the IMF: they offer condition-free loans based on ex-ante 
qualification criteria. 
The new facilities of 2008–2009 respond to a long-simmering fault line in the IMF. In the 
IMF’s early years, many members were expected to be both contributors and borrowers, but 
over time sharp distinctions emerged. Advanced economies that control a majority of IMF 
shares are now almost exclusively contributors and view the IMF as a guardian of systemic 
stability (or less charitably, as a guarantor of investments) and a manager of the moral 
hazard associated with emergency lending. Borrowers, in turn, are middle- or low-income 
countries with little voting power that depend on the IMF as a financial backstop in a crisis.
14 
This division sharpened in the Asian crisis and many potential borrowers—particularly those 
in East Asia—became unwilling to seek assistance from the IMF. In response to the global 
crisis of 2008, the IMF’s resources were expanded and some borrowing reemerged. This 
has further intensified the pressure on the IMF to make its facilities more attractive. 
These tensions reflect, in part, the sluggish adjustment of IMF governance. Its highest 
decision-making body is the Board of Governors,
15 comprising one governor and one 
alternate appointed by constituencies of one or more countries. This board is advised by two 
ministerial committees. The International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) consists 
of 24 governors and meets twice a year to provide council on international monetary and 
financial issues, on amendments to the Articles of Agreement, and on systemic 
disturbances. Its communiqués guide the IMF's work program for the following six months. 
The Development Committee, with a composition similar to that of the IMFC, also meets 
twice each year, and advises the IMF and the World Bank on development, trade, and 
environmental issues.
16 
The IMF’s day-to-day decisions are handled by an Executive Board, to which the Board of 
Governors has delegated most of its powers.
17 The Executive Board consists of 24 executive 
directors, of whom five are appointed by countries with large quotas and 19 are elected by groups of 
countries.
18 It selects the managing director and oversees the IMF’s operations. The managing 
director has been traditionally European, but in 2009 the G20 agreed to a merit-based selection 
process. 
The voting powers of individual countries depend on quotas, which also determine financial 
commitments and ability to borrow.
19 Quotas are negotiated when a country enters the IMF 
and depend on variables such as gross domestic product (GDP), international reserves, 
                                                  
13 The FCL allows longer repayment periods (3.25–5 years) and imposes no hard cap on access to IMF 
resources, which will be assessed on a case-by-case basis (the SLF limited access to 500% of quota), and 
introduces flexibility to draw at any time on the credit line so that it can be used as a precautionary instrument 
(which was not allowed under the SLF). A similar facility, called the contingent credit line, had been created in 
1999 but was never used, and hence was allowed to cease in 2003 due lack of interest among potential 
borrower members. 
14 For example, Joyce and Sandler (2008) list the IMF’s key functions as offering technical assistance, facilitating 
currency convertibility, providing a commitment device for policies, and creating insurance for correcting 
balance-of-payments problems without resorting to more costly measures. 
15 For the current IMF organization chart, see: http://www.imf.org/external/np/obp/orgcht.htm. 
16 For more information on the IMFC and Development Committee, see http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/ 
groups.htm#IC. 
17  The Board of Governors retains ultimate powers, including electing or appointing executive directors, and 
approving resolutions on the admittance of new members and the terms and conditions of their membership, 
the compulsory withdrawal of members, increases in IMF quotas, and amendments of the Articles of 
Agreement. It is also the ultimate arbiter on issues related to the interpretation of the Articles of Agreement. 
18 The US, Japan, PRC, Saudi Arabia, and the Russian Federation are single-country constituencies. 
19 Under SBAs and extended arrangements, a member can borrow up to 100% of its quota annually and 300% 
cumulatively, although it may have access to more funds under special circumstances. 
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current payments, current receipts, and the variability of the receipts.
20 Members are 
allocated 250 basic votes plus one vote for each 100,000 special drawing rights of quota.
21 
Quotas have been increased several times (see Table 1), while basic votes have remained 
constant, increasing the voting shares of larger countries. Many decisions require simple 
majorities, but major decisions, including the amendment of the Articles of Agreement, 
require an 85% majority.
22 
Table 1: IMF Quota Expansions 
 
Quota Review  Date  Increase (%) 
First Quinquennial  1950  --- 
Second Quinquennial  1955  --- 
1958/1959  February and April 1959 60.7 
Third Quinquennial  1960  --- 
Fourth Quinquennial  March 1965  30.7 
Fifth General  February 1970  35.4 
Sixth General  March 1976  33.6 
Seventh General  December 1978  50.9 
Eighth General  March 1983  47.5 
Ninth General  June 1990  50 
Tenth General  1995  --- 
Eleventh General  January 1998  45 
Twelfth General  2005  --- 
Thirteenth General  2008  --- 
IMF = International Monetary Fund. 
--- no increase. 
Source: IMF (2009a). 
As a result, IMF decisions are controlled by a small number of countries, most of which are 
original members. Quota revisions have not kept pace with economic change.
23 As Figure 1 
shows, only nine of 185 countries control a majority of votes (sufficient for most decisions), 
up from only three at the launch of the IMF in 1945. Now, as then, the US alone can veto a 
major decision that requires an 85% super-majority vote as its voting share is 17%. 
                                                  
20 See: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/071107.pdf for a discussion of the quota formulae and the 
data used to implement the quota formulae. 
21   For a breakdown of IMF member quotas and voting power, 
see http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm. 
22 In addition to an 85% majority, 60 positive votes are required. 
23 The IMF's Board of Governors conducts general quota reviews every five years. Any proposed change to 
quotas must be approved by an 85% majority. 
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GATT = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, IMF = International Monetary Fund, WTO = World Trade 
Organization. 
Sources: World Bank. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Members 
(available http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/ 
0,,contentMDK:20122865~menuPK:64020025~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036~isCURL 
:Y,00.html [accessed 20 April 2009]); WTO. The 128 Countries that had Signed GATT by 1994  
(available http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm [accessed 20 April 2009]). 
Voting shares today are especially low for rapidly growing emerging market countries, such 
as Brazil, People’s Republic of China (PRC), and India. Kelkar et al. (2005) note, for 
example, that these three countries had 19% fewer votes than Belgium, Italy, and 
Netherlands collectively, although they had 21% more nominal GDP, 400% more purchasing 
power GDP, and 2,800% more population than the second group. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the shares of developing and emerging economies in IMF 
quotas, and in global trade and GDP (in terms of purchasing power), two rough indicators of 
their importance in the world economy. After an early period of decline (a period dominated 
by the acceleration of European growth), the trade share of developing and emerging 
economies has risen more rapidly than their share in IMF quotas. This contrast is even 
clearer for their share in world GDP. Figure 3 shows similar data for Asia’s rapidly growing 
economies. The figure clearly suggests that their rising weight in the global economy has not 
been reflected in IMF quotas. 
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Figure 2: Developing and Emerging Economies’ Shares in  































IMF quota share 
World GDP share (PPP) 
World trade share 
 
GDP = gross domestic product, IMF = International Monetary Fund, PPP = purchasing power parity. 
Sources: IMF quota share and world trade share based on IMF (2009b), world GDP share (PPP) based on IMF World 
Economic Outlook Database, April 2009  
(available http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx [accessed May 2009]). 
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IMF quota share 
World GDP share (PPP) 
World trade share 
GDP = gross domestic product, IMF = International Monetary Fund, PPP = purchasing power parity. 
Sources: IMF quota share and world trade share based on IMF (2009b), world GDP share (PPP) based on IMF World 
Economic Outlook Database, April 2009 (available: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/ 
01/weodata/index.aspx [accessed May 2009]). 
Reform proposals have centered on changing the quota formulas (Cooper 2000, Bryant 
2008a, Kelkar et al. 2005). In April 2008 the IMF Board recommended increasing quotas for 
54 members (mostly emerging-market countries),
24 tripling basic votes, fixing the ratio of 
basic votes to total votes in the future, and adding two more alternate directors for African 
countries. But the effect of these changes will be modest: for example, while the combined 
voting share of the PRC, India, Republic of Korea, Brazil, and Mexico will rise from 8.2% to 
10.7%, it will still lag behind their combined 11.9% share of world GDP.
25 
Sub-global cooperation in macroeconomics is emerging in two ways. One path involves 
“variable geometry” within the IMF: in a sharp break with practice, in 2008 the IMF involved 
several stakeholders in designing and negotiating programs in Eastern European and Nordic 
countries (Takagi 2009). These partners, including the European Central Bank (ECB), EU, 
and Nordic countries, roughly matched the IMF’s lending commitments. The full implications 
of this approach are unclear; they could represent special cases, reflecting Europe’s 
dominant role in the IMF, or, if systematically applied, could offer a new model for building 
flexible partnerships for delivering broader services. 
A second path involves cooperation outside the IMF. The ECB, of course, has taken over 
managing key macroeconomic functions for the Eurozone countries. But in addition, several 
countries have provided liquidity support bilaterally (notably the US to Mexico in 1994, and to 
                                                  
24 See Bryant (2008a) for a discussion of the proposed quota formula. 
25 See Linn, Bryant, and Bradford (2008). Since these proposals are amendments to the Articles of Agreement, 
they will require legislative approval in several member countries. 
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Brazil, Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Singapore in 2008). Finally, parallel multilateral 
institutions are also emerging. The most prominent is the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), 
encompassing bilateral swap agreements of US$84 billion among the ASEAN+3 countries
26. 
In recent meetings, these economies agreed to convert CMI into a multilateral, self-
managed, reserve-pooling arrangement, called the CMI Multilateralized (CMIM),
27 to provide 
US$120 billion for the CMIM, and to establish a surveillance unit to monitor economic 
developments in participating countries. For now, a country must participate in an IMF 
program to draw on more than 20% of the facility, but the link could be relaxed once the 
surveillance unit gains experience and credibility. 
3.2  Development Finance 
The World Bank Group supplies the global public good of development through low-cost 
loans and technical assistance to middle- and low-income countries. It comprises the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the International Development 
Association, for assisting the poorest countries with interest-free, long-term loans;
28 the 
International Finance Corporation, for investing in private projects; and the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency, for providing political risk insurance. The World Bank’s 
“investment operations” provide loans (market-based or concessionary) to sectors based on 
agreed outputs and performance targets. The World Bank’s “development policy operations” 
provide untied budget support for policy reform. The World Bank also lends in the case of 
adverse developments
29 and, through special development policy loans, for reforms in 
countries approaching or in crisis. Like the IMF, the World Bank provides technical support 
and drafts periodic Country Assistance Strategies to identify development challenges, 
especially as they affect poverty. 
The World Bank’s governance parallels that of the IMF. The World Bank is owned by the 
same 185 countries and is run by a Board of Governors appointed by them (usually 
ministers of finance or development). The Board of Governors delegates many 
responsibilities to executive directors, who oversee policies, lending operations, and the 
administrative budget, and appoint the president.
30  As in the IMF, the five largest 
shareholders each appoint an executive director and the other 180 members elect 19 
executive directors. Voting shares are the same as in the IMF. 
A decentralized decision structure is well established in development finance. The World 
Bank’s work is paralleled by four regional development banks: the African Development 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank. These are further complemented 
by smaller sub-regional banks. The Meltzer Commission (Meltzer 2000) envisioned an 
especially large role for these institutions—eventually for them to handle all lending—but 
noted that their current activities often overlap with those of the World Bank. The 2009 
London Summit committed to general capital increases in the regional banks, perhaps 
signaling a longer-term increase in their relative role in global development finance. 
The ownership structure of the regional development banks includes global as well as 
regional members. For example, ADB has 67 members, of which 48 are from Asia and the 
Pacific and 19 from other regions. Regional members contribute 63.4% of subscribed capital 
                                                  
26  ASEAN member countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam) plus PRC, Japan, and Republic of Korea. 
27 Under the CMIM, each country would manage its reserves independently, but an amount committed to the 
CMIM would be earmarked for CMIM use. 
28 These carry a small service charge of 0.75% on funds paid out. 
29 The deferred drawdown option. 
30 See http://go.worldbank.org/9Q8KOMQPE0 for more details and a list of current members of the Executive 
Board. 
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and have a 65% share of voting power. The largest regional member, Japan, contributes 
15.6% of the capital and holds 12.75% of votes. The largest non-regional member, the US, 
has capital and voting shares equal to Japan’s. Governance is similar to that of the IMF, with 
a Board of Governors delegating day-to-day responsibilities to a 12-person Board of 
Directors, of whom two thirds are from the region. The president must be from the region 
and has always been Japanese.
31 
3.3  Trade Liberalization 
The services provided by the WTO focus on facilitating global negotiations and monitoring 
the world trading system. The WTO’s ongoing work program includes trade policy reviews to 
monitor compliance with WTO obligations and offering services for dispute settlement. Under 
the WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), eight 
rounds of international agreements have been conducted. Each round has become longer 
and more complicated. While the early rounds were completed within one year, the fourth 
lasted two years, the fifth four years, and the sixth six years. The seventh and most recently 
completed, the Uruguay Round, took nine years to negotiate. The current Doha 
Development Agenda was launched in 2001 and is in a stalemate at this writing. Although 
the WTO director general and participants often reaffirm their intent to conclude the round, 
the current global economic downturn is only likely to make progress more difficult. 
The governance of the WTO is very different from those of the IMF and the World Bank. The 
WTO has no board or executive body. It is member-driven and consensus-based; decisions 
are facilitated by councils and committees. At different times, various smaller groups of 
countries have conducted negotiations in an effort to achieve breakthroughs that might be 
acceptable to a wider membership. The ministerial conference meets once every two years 
and makes decisions on multilateral trade agreements. Day-to-day work between meetings 
is managed by a small secretariat which supports a general council, the Dispute Settlement 
Body, and a Trade Policy Review Body. 
At the same time, a sub-global framework for trade is rapidly emerging. Partly because of 
the stalemate in the Doha Round, bilateral and regional trade arrangements have grown 
exponentially (ADB 2008), and now include major agreements in Europe, North America, 
Latin America, the Gulf countries, and between ASEAN and various countries. Many 
countries participate in overlapping agreements and pursue regional and extra-regional 
agreements at the same time. Although these initiatives are theoretically subject to GATT 
Article XXIV (which requires the full liberalization of substantially all trade), they have been 
negotiated without any WTO involvement. While analytical studies (Baldwin 2006) show 
large benefits from consolidating regional agreements into a coherent global system, at this 
writing there are no serious negotiations underway to connect regional arrangements. 
3.4  Financial System Stability 
An important factor behind the global financial crisis is the lack of a global financial 
regulatory and supervisory framework. Such a system would regulate, monitor, and 
supervise the cross-border activities of systemically important financial institutions, as well 
as instruments and markets that affect systemic stability. No such system currently exists. 
The Financial Stability Forum, launched in 1999, has sought to encourage information 
exchange and international cooperation in financial supervision and surveillance, but has left 
regulatory functions to a division of labor between home and host authorities. Supervisory 
colleges have been set up to monitor and supervise the cross-border activities of large 
financial institutions, but their effectiveness remains untested, especially in the event of 
                                                  
31   For more information on ADB’s organizational structure, see http://www.adb.org/About/membership.asp; 
http://www.adb.org/GOV/default.asp; and http://www.adb.org/BOD/default.asp. 
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disagreements among regulators. A better global financial regulatory and supervisory 
system is needed to encompass the varied interests of a growing number of players and to 
address the challenges raised by systemically important financial institutions that operate in 
many jurisdictions. A partially decentralized approach may provide a way to establish such a 
regime in light of large initial differences in regional financial systems. 
4.  GOVERNANCE REFORM OF IEIS 
4.1  The Governance Trilemma 
There is broad agreement that IEIs need to become: (i) more democratic, (ii) more effective 
in delivering the public goods expected from them, and, for political reasons, (iii) universal, 
by accepting all countries that take on reasonable obligations of membership. Unfortunately, 
these requirements add up to a “trilemma:” achieving any one makes achieving the others 
more difficult. Major international institutions have succeeded in being at times democratic 
(responsive to individual members), effective (able to act and adapt), and universal (globally 
inclusive), but none are generally all three at the same time. 
The trilemma is illustrated in Figure 4. The triangle corner of institutions that are both 
universal and democratic is populated by several global institutions, including the WTO and 
the United Nations. These institutions typically fall short on the scale of effectiveness—they 
have difficulty making and implementing decisions. The corner of democratic and effective 
institutions is exemplified by institutions such as the G7/G8, but these fail on the measure of 
universality.
32 And the corner of universal and effective institutions is illustrated by the IMF 
and the World Bank, which can act quickly and decisively, as they did, for example, in the 
1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, but do not use open, democratic processes to arrive at 
decisions. 
Figure 4: The Governance Trilemma 
G7/G8
Democratic Effective
UN/WTO Universal IMF/World Bank 
 
G7 = Group of Seven, G8 = Group of Eight, IMF = International Monetary Fund, UN = United Nations, WTO = World 
Trade. 
Source: Authors’ own rendition. 
                                                  
32 Keohane and Nye (2003) suggest that within universal institutions, small clubs typically emerge in order to 
promote and control the institution’s policies. For such groups to be effective, they have to undermine the 
institution’s democratic process. 
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The tensions captured in the governance trilemma have led to underinvestment in 
international organizations and a shortage in international public goods. The resources of 
IEIs have become small compared to those routinely available to governments for financial 
interventions and to private institutions for speculative investments. (The scale of the new 
commitments made at the 2009 London Summit is one indicator of this shortfall.) IEIs have 
also become less responsive to their members—to developing countries in delivering 
policies on technology transfer and international investment, and to advanced countries in 
addressing environment, labor, and human rights issues. Over time, the number of 
international institutions has grown and each has expanded substantially, but the global 
benefits derived from these institutions have arguably diminished. 
4.2  Institutional Families as a Solution 
Are there ways to make international economic governance at once universal, democratic, 
and flexible, that is, to resolve the trilemma of Figure 4? In this paper we explore one 
possible solution, that of replacing monolithic IEIs with multi-layered decision-making bodies. 
The architecture might consist of “institutional families,” in which global IEIs act as central 
institutions that coordinate related, but relatively independent decision-making bodies. This 
is akin to the concept of “functional federalism” advocated on a national level and in Europe 
to improve flexibility in the provision of public goods (Casella and Frey 1992). 
In the language of club theory, this innovation would seek to reinvigorate competition among 
smaller clubs to supply services that are not supplied by large ones. These new clubs should 
be more fluid than the existing ones; for example, entry and exit could be encouraged by a 
framework that specifically supports limited cooperative arrangements within existing clubs. 
The new clubs could target new users or subsets of members of old clubs. The key point is 
that they would produce services that differ from those demanded by the members that 
dominate decision making in existing IEIs. Will global institutions agree to such innovations? 
They may, provided that they see significant threats from continued rigidity (as the IMF did in 
2008) and benefits from adjustment. Organizations that deliver public goods (and in 
particular their leaders and staff) typically benefit from their production by gaining funding 
and influence. 
One approach to creating a multilayered decision-making structure is to create mechanisms 
within established IEIs to enable coalitions to reach agreements on special policy needs. An 
example is offered by the IMF’s General Agreements to Borrow and New Agreements to 
Borrow to create a platform by willing richer members to provide additional financial 
resources for countries in need. Another example is found in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) efforts to provide a platform that can be used by 
interested countries to formulate policies on various issues, ranging from trade credit to 
investment. A further example is provided by “trust funds” established by groups of countries 
within the World Bank and regional development banks. These agreements would be subject 
to rules that ensure the consistency of initiatives with the IEI’s overall objectives and 
operations. But the projects themselves would be designed, managed, and funded by a 
coalition, perhaps with agreed co-financing from a central facility established for that 
purpose. 
A second approach is to create independent institutions linked to parent IEIs by rules and 
procedures that ensure global consistency. An example of a similar approach can be found 
in development finance, where the World Bank acts as a global development bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank, ADB, African Development Bank, and European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development act as regional development banks. Although there are 
no set rules to ensure consistency among these institutions—at least for now—the 
overlapping shareholder governments can help to ensure global consistency. Another 
example of such a rule is GATT Article XXIV, which establishes conditions for regional trade 
agreements. But in practice, the WTO has not attempted to build a community of trade 
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agreements using Article XXIV; it has been almost entirely preoccupied with promoting and 
managing global agreements and negotiations, and has not supported, or even monitored, 
free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations. A more coherent system would require a balanced 
approach toward the sub-global and global tracks, and stronger links between them. 
Institutional designs that integrate global and sub-global decision making can enhance the 
provision of public services in at least three different ways. First, institutional families can 
share infrastructure and administrative functions, such as human and financial resources, 
lending, contracting, research, and evaluation. The financial track record of an institutional 
family will also help in accessing capital markets, if needed. Second, institutional families 
can facilitate new initiatives by reducing the commitment and cost involved in undertaking 
them—in other words, by facilitating entry into and exit from new areas of operation. New 
initiatives can start quickly by building on the infrastructure of an existing organization, and 
old ones can disappear by transferring excess resources to other, continuing functions. 
Finally, institutional families can improve the coherence of the various services offered by 
smaller groups by adopting mechanisms that minimize inconsistencies and duplication. 
5.  APPLICATIONS AND PROPOSALS 
The global decision-making framework we envision would consist of global and sub-global 
institutions and principles that define the division of labor between them. This framework is 
illustrated in Table 2 for the four functional areas considered in this study. 
Table 2: Institutional Families in Global Economic Governance 
 
IMF = International Monetary Fund, RTA = regional trade agreement, WTO = World Trade Organization. 
 




Surveillance, systemic stability, 
crisis lending 
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralized 
Regional surveillance, stability,  




Global public goods: poverty, 
environment 
Regional banks 





Global disciplines, dispute 
resolution, Article XXIV 
RTAs 
Deeper, wider agreements 
Financial 
system stability 
Financial Stability Board 
Global standards, colleges of 
regulators 
Asian Financial Stability Dialogue 
Region-specific regulatory initiatives 
Since some institutions already exist in most cells of Table 2, we call attention to existing 
institutions that might be strengthened, as well as to new ones to be developed. The goal is 
a framework that supports decentralization and links sub-global decisions with global ones. 
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5.1  IMF Family 
The role of the IMF in the context of the current global financial crisis makes reform 
especially urgent. As noted, this requires not only changes in the voting shares and 
management of the IMF, but also initiatives to resolve its deeper structural tensions. In 2009, 
for example, the IMF faces large demands for risky lending in Eastern Europe and the Baltic 
states, due to the region’s indebtedness to foreign banks (mostly from Western Europe), 
while the emerging economies of East Asia have strong reserve positions and are generally 
reluctant to turn to the IMF for support. 
The geographical tensions faced by the IMF reflect, in part, differential patterns of economic 
linkages. If regional macroeconomic or financial spillovers are intense relative to global ones, 
regions will have a large stake in resolving them. In such cases, regional institutions or 
facilities can be effective “first responders,” offering more timely interventions and greater 
accountability. Global interventions may also be necessary for global insurance. But these 
could be a second layer of response, complementing regional interventions. 
A decentralized strategy could also minimize the possibility (and frequent charge) that the 
IMF will react too slowly in a crisis because it represents the interests of other regions, or 
because it is trying to contain moral hazard elsewhere. Regional interventions could rely on 
the region’s ability to gather information and contain moral hazard with minimum 
conditionality. They would also create incentives for policy makers to assume greater 
responsibility for anticipating and averting cross-border risks within their regions. 
Recent IMF innovations to involve outside stakeholders represent a sharp departure from 
earlier practice, where major lending decisions were made by the IMF alone, even when the 
World Bank was involved in parallel operations. Similarly, the CMIM represents an important 
“bottom up” initiative toward decentralization. The CMIM is an important experiment in the 
ability of regions to enhance stability while making interventions more palatable and 
effective. 
Further decentralization could be achieved by: 
•  Institutionalizing the involvement of co-lenders in IMF programs. Such 
arrangements could be subject to limits (say, each participating stakeholder would 
have to commit to financing at least 20% of a loan), as well as to usual board 
approvals. But they should be designed to encourage cooperation between the 
IMF and other stakeholders, especially regional partners such as the ECB and the 
CMIM. 
•  Strengthening regional institutions that can underwrite macroeconomic stability as 
“first responders,” including, in particular, the CMIM, and welcoming them into the 
institutional framework of IMF support. 
•  Expanding cooperation between the IMF and other institutions in surveillance. The 
oversight of government policies, especially of influential members, is difficult for 
any official organization. This is an important reason for sharing the information 
they collect with official agencies such as the ECB, ASEAN, and the CMIM, and 
with the private sector. Differences in interpretation can then provide checks on 
analytical outputs. 
Ideally, such a system would bring greater resources to the task of maintaining international 
macroeconomic stability, as well as provide more ways for collecting information and for 
organizing responses to crises that occur in different parts of the world. 
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5.2  World Bank Family 
The challenge in development finance is to develop a flexible and coherent division of labor 
and appropriate connections among existing organizations. The Meltzer report (2000) 
notwithstanding, there is a rationale for a global development lending facility. Some types of 
development finance address explicitly global goals (in particular, global externalities and 
other global priorities) which would not be adequately financed or prioritized by regional 
institutions. These ought to be handled by the World Bank. But that leaves many other types 
of lending that could be more efficiently administered regionally, as the Meltzer report 
argued. 
The World Bank’s global mission would include lending for projects that address broad, 
global objectives, such as the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals. It would also 
include lending to alleviate negative global externalities, such as climate change, global 
energy and food shortages, and global epidemics. And the World Bank would also remain 
the logical site for activities with great economies-of-scale, such as providing an 
administrative infrastructure for development finance and serving as a “knowledge bank” to 
collect and disseminate research findings.
33 
Regional development banks are best positioned to address sub-global development 
challenges, particularly for the provision of regional public goods to be shared by countries 
with common interests. Their lending could benefit from a region’s pooled knowledge, 
expertise, and financial resources, complemented by global knowledge and expertise 
provided by the World Bank. An example would be investments for regional infrastructure or 
regional financial markets, which would require an institutional framework that permits a 
group of countries to join together to approve and manage activities. Regional development 
banks can function as trusted facilitators to make this happen, with the World Bank invited as 
a co-financier or a knowledge partner as needed. 
A coherent framework for such activities would provide opportunities for global and regional 
lenders to pursue different policies, while applying guidelines and rules that ensure common 
operational practices, encourage collaboration (for example, on regional development 
projects that have poverty alleviating elements), and provide for frequent exchange of 
information and expertise, including personnel. 
Further decentralization could be achieved by: 
•  Strengthening regional development banks by increasing their capital, permitting 
their missions to be set more independently by members, and providing greater 
voice to regional members in managing regional institutions. 
•  Drawing sharper distinctions between the global objectives of the World Bank—
with a focus on global public goods—and the more region-focused missions of 
regional development banks. 
•  Expanding the capabilities of the World Bank to support regional banks, for 
example, via research, infrastructure, and possibly co-lending for regional 
initiatives. 
Ideally, this structure will enable the World Bank to act not only as a guardian of global public 
goods, but also as a supporter of regional public goods provision through cooperation with 
regional development banks. The World Bank could aid regional efforts by augmenting 
                                                  
33 The Meltzer report (2000) also envisioned limiting the World Bank’s role to these intrinsically global public 
goods. However, that report saw little need for development finance beyond such public goods. In our view, 
such decisions should be left to groups of member countries. They could interpret public goods differently and 
may support projects, such as regional technology development, that would not be funded by a universal 
membership. 
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regional knowledge, expertise, and resources (say, through funds dedicated for co-lending 
for regional projects). 
5.3  WTO Family 
Even if a successful outcome to the Doha Round is eventually achieved (at this writing, an 
unlikely outcome), global negotiations in the WTO are approaching limits. New rounds of 
negotiations are unlikely to be undertaken under the present system. At the same time, 
regional trade agreements continue to proliferate. As Baldwin (2006) has argued, there is 
much urgency in engaging the WTO in the regional arrangements that trade negotiations 
now increasingly follow. 
Baldwin proposes reestablishing WTO control over the regional negotiations process. He 
suggests that the WTO: (i) generate analysis on the process of regional agreements, (ii) 
launch negotiations to consolidate regional agreements, and (iii) provide a forum for the 
“spoke” countries of hub-and-spoke systems in order to encourage broader agreements. 
These are important goals, but we argue that the WTO could go a step further, and play a 
direct role in the administration of regional agreements. Such a role would make it more 
relevant to the international trade system and help it gain greater influence in the 
development and administration of international agreements. Such interactions could begin 
between the WTO and major regional trading arrangements (such as ASEAN, European 
Free Trade Association, and Mercado Comun del Cono Sur [Southern Cone Common 
Market] [MERCOSUR]) to directly address the challenge of aligning FTA practices with 
global rules. It would take innovative adjustments in the WTO and regional institutions to 
achieve collaboration. But there are important, symmetrical benefits from such cooperation: 
regional institutions could profit from the expertise, infrastructure, and credibility of the WTO, 
while the WTO could advance the broad interests of its membership by participating in the 
design and administration of regional initiatives. 
Further decentralization could be achieved by: 
•  Establishing a new function within the WTO to support and integrate “limited trade 
liberalization,” i.e., agreements that cover limited sectors and countries. This 
function would support regional FTA negotiations and facilitate and monitor their 
implementation. 
•  Developing a realistic framework of rules for limited trade liberalization. This effort 
would expand and strengthen Article XXIV to permit a broader range of limited 
agreements, while ensuring that these avoid injuring non-members. Ideally, these 
rules will lead to new trade-creating agreements such as the 1996 Information 
Technology Agreement. 
•  Creating a framework to consolidate sectoral and regional agreements into global 
agreements. 
•  Encouraging regional groups to adopt multilateral-friendly approaches, including 
lower most-favored-nation tariffs, simple rules of origin (such as the 40% regional 
content rule adopted by ASEAN), and regular consultations with non-regional 
partners on trade and investment issues. 
In the Asian context, these initiatives would target the consolidation of Asian trade 
agreements into a single Asia-wide FTA, and the connection of the resulting FTA with North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), EU, MERCOSUR, and other regional 
agreements.
34 Through such initiatives, the WTO family would support new liberalization 
initiatives along with stronger efforts to streamline and consolidate past agreements that 
were negotiated independently from each other. 
                                                  
34 See Kawai and Wignaraja (2009). 
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5.4  FSB Family 
The global financial crisis has highlighted the lack of an international framework for 
monitoring, regulating, and supervising the cross-border activities of systemically important 
financial firms. The new FSB—a successor to the Financial Stability Forum—established by 
the 2009 London Summit is intended to create such an institutional framework.
35 The FSB 
has been charged with assessing the vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system, 
identifying and overseeing actions needed to address these, and promoting coordination and 
information exchange among authorities responsible for financial stability. In collaboration 
with the IMF, it is also charged with providing early warning of macroeconomic and financial 
risks and proposing actions to remedy them. 
The effectiveness of the FSB will ultimately depend on the quality of supervision and 
regulation in national and regional financial systems. In the US, for example, new steps will 
be required to consolidate what is still a highly fragmented regulatory and supervisory 
system. In Europe too, a new, EU-wide supervisory framework will be needed. More 
generally, since the FSB includes a limited number of economies, its work will need to be 
extended across many other countries through parallel regional efforts. 
A partially decentralized architecture for the FSB could be developed by organizing regional 
forums such as the Asian Financial Stability Dialogue around the FSB, as proposed by ADB 
(2008). Such institutions could play valuable roles by translating FSB initiatives into a 
regional context and then helping to implement them. They could also help to collect regional 
inputs for the FSB process and, more fundamentally, orchestrate efforts to integrate and 
deepen regional financial markets. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Club theory provides a framework for examining the challenges of global cooperation. It 
suggests, in particular, that while clubs present effective solutions to problems common to 
reasonably homogeneous members, they become inflexible and ineffective as their 
membership grows large and diverse. As currently structured, the IEIs conform to these 
predictions and are not meeting the public goods requirements of the world economy. 
Partially decentralized decision making offers a promising solution. The concept of 
institutional families—global institutions built from regional or otherwise differentiated 
building blocks—offers a way to put decentralization into practice. Under such a system, 
decisions would be made by different groups of countries, but would be governed by 
common rules and standards and would benefit from a shared infrastructure. Such 
“federalism” has served governments well in other contexts and has begun to emerge also in 
the existing framework of international organizations. 
Crisis stimulates innovation. The opportunity created by the current crisis should be used not 
merely to change the “chairs and shares” of existing institutions, but also to make them more 
flexible once and for all. The newly emerging arrangements for global financial stability may 
also build on such principles. Institutional reform needs to look beyond the causes of the 
present crisis as it is impossible to predict those of the next one. New, unanticipated 
challenges will inevitably come, and partial decentralization offers a tool for coping with them 
in real time. 
                                                  
35 Membership of the FSB has been expanded to include all G20 members and a few others.
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APPENDIX: IMF VOTES AS OF APRIL 2008 
United States  371,743   Poland 13,940   Kazakhstan  3,907 
Japan  133,378  Finland  12,888  Croatia  3,901 
Germany  130,332  Algeria  12,797  Slovak  Republic  3,825 
France  107,635  Turkey  12,163  Trinidad  and  Tobago  3,606 
United  Kingdom  107,635  Iraq  12,134  Viet  Nam  3,541 
China, People’s Rep. of  81,151   Libya 11,487   Côte  d'Ivoire  3,502 
Italy  70,805  Thailand  11,069  Uruguay  3,315 
Saudi  Arabia  70,105  Hungary  10,634  Ecuador  3,273 
Canada  63,942  Pakistan  10,587  Syrian  Arab  Republic  3,186 
Russian  Federation  59,704  Romania  10,552  Tunisia  3,115 
Netherlands  51,874  Egypt  9,687  Angola  3,113 
Belgium  46,302  Israel  9,532  Luxembourg  3,041 
India 41,832   New  Zealand  9,196  Uzbekistan  3,006 
Switzerland  34,835  Philippines  9,049  Jamaica  2,985 
Australia  32,614  Portugal  8,924  Kenya  2,964 
Mexico  31,778  Singapore  8,875  Qatar  2,888 
Spain  30,739  Chile  8,811  Myanmar  2,834 
Brazil 30,611   Ireland 8,634   Yemen 2,685 
Korea, Rep. of  29,523   Greece 8,480   Slovenia  2,567 
Venezuela 26,841   Czech  Republic  8,443  Dominican  Republic  2,439 
Sweden  24,205  Colombia  7,990  Brunei  Darussalam  2,402 
Argentina  21,421  Bulgaria  6,652  Guatemala  2,352 
Indonesia  21,043  Peru  6,634  Panama  2,316 
Austria 18,973   United  Arab  Emirates 6,367   Lebanon    2,280 
South Africa  18,935   Morocco 6,132   Tanzania    2,239 
Nigeria  17,782  Bangladesh  5,583  Oman    2,190 
Norway  16,967  Congo  5,580  Cameroon    2,107 
Denmark  16,678  Zambia  5,141  Uganda    2,055 
Iran  15,222   Republic of Serbia  4,927   Bolivia   1,965 
Malaysia  15,116   Sri Lanka  4,384   El Salvador   1,963 
Kuwait  14,061  Belarus  4,114  Jordan    1,955 
Ukraine  13,970  Ghana  3,940  Sudan    1,947 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina   1,941   Armenia   1,170   Gambia   561 
Costa Rica   1,891   Guyana   1,159   Montenegro   525 
Afghanistan   1,869   Kyrgyz Republic   1,138   Belize   438 
Senegal   1,868   Cambodia   1,125   San Marino   420 
Azerbaijan    1,859  Tajikistan    1,120  Vanuatu    420 
Gabon    1,793  Congo    1,096  Eritrea    409 
Georgia    1,753  Haiti    1,069  Djibouti    409 
Lithuania   1,692   Rwanda   1,051   St. Lucia   403 
Cyprus    1,646  Burundi    1,020  Guinea-Bissau    392 
Namibia   1,615   Turkmenistan   1,002   Antigua and Barbuda   385 
Bahrain    1,600  Togo    984  Grenada    367 
Ethiopia   1,587   Nepal   963   Samoa   366 
Papua New Guinea   1,566   Fiji Islands  953   Solomon Islands  354 
Bahamas, The  1,553   Malawi   944   Cape Verde   346 
Nicaragua   1,550   Macedonia   939   St. Kitts and Nevis   339 
Honduras    1,545  Barbados    925  Comoros    339 
Liberia   1,542   Niger   908   Seychelles   338 
Latvia    1,518  Estonia    902  St.  Vincent,  Grenadines  333 
Moldova   1,482   Botswana   880   Timor-Leste  332 
Madagascar    1,472  Benin    869  Dominica    332 
Iceland   1,426   Burkina Faso   852   Maldives   332 
Mozambique   1,386   Chad   810   São Tomé and Príncipe  324 
Guinea   1,321   Central African Rep.  807   Tonga   319 
Sierra Leone   1,287   Lao People’s Dem. Rep.  779   Bhutan   313 
Malta   1,270   Mongolia   761   Kiribati   306 
Mauritius   1,266   Swaziland   757   Micronesia, Fed. States of  301 
Paraguay   1,249   Albania   737   Marshall Islands  285 
Mali   1,183   Lesotho   599   Palau   28 
Suriname   1,171   Equatorial Guinea   576
Source: IMF (2009b). 